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INTRODUCTION
A recognized benefit of arbitration is the power of the disputants to select, usually in advance, the procedural rules that will
govern their dispute resolution.1 The right to determine procedural
rules may be particularly important in transnational agreements
where contracting parties are from States with different legal cultures.
Of course, Parties capitalizing on this advantage do not draft new procedural rules for every transaction.2 Instead, the parties incorporate
procedural rules created by arbitral institutions into their agreements.
This creates clear incentives for institutions to develop thorough yet
flexible procedural rules. Despite this incentive, the rules themselves
may be deficient in resolving a particular procedural issue. In these
cases, the tribunal must make an important determination: Is there a
gap in the rules that must be filled by an exercise of the tribunal’s
discretion or does the silence imply an intent to preclude a particular
procedural mechanism?
Much has been written on the identification of gaps in party
contracts by arbitral tribunals; however, the literature is largely silent
on the identification of gaps in procedural rules.3 In this paper I will
1. NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, §
1.104 (6th ed. 2015).
2. Some transactions may require more detailed procedural rules than others. For
example, transactions involving multiple parties or state actors may encounter procedural
issues inadequately dealt with by the chosen institutional rules. See JAN PAULSSON ET AL.,
THE FRESHFIELDS GUIDE TO ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 95–114
(3rd ed. 2010) (discussing recurring situations that can be resolved during the drafting
stage of an arbitration agreement).
3. See, e.g., Joseph Mamounas, ICCA 2014. Gap Filling in International Arbitration:
An Unsettled Territory, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Apr. 23, 2014), http://arbitration-
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provide background on the nature and consequences of a gap and propose a Borrowed Rule Principle to help tribunals determine whether a
gap exists. I will apply the Borrowed Rule Principle to two provisions
from the Center for Arbitration and Mediation of the Chamber of Commerce Brazil-Canada Rules (CAM-CCBC Rules) to determine whether
those provisions contain gaps that must be filled.
I. BACKGROUND
Section I will address two issues. First, I will discuss party consent, which provides two sources of power —the inherent power to
define procedure and the power to fill gaps in the parties’ contract —
that enable arbitral tribunals to fill gaps in procedural rules. Subsequently, I will discuss the consequences of a tribunal finding a gap in
the chosen procedural rules.
Under national and international arbitration law, arbitral
tribunals are afforded a significant amount of power to resolve a dispute before it. However, this power is best described as dormant
because a triggering event must occur before a tribunal can exercise
it.4 In all cases this triggering event is the consent of the involved parties.5 By consenting to arbitration, parties fulfill the necessary
condition for tribunals to exercise their adjudicatory powers created by
national law and treaties to resolve the parties’ dispute. Once parties
have consented to arbitration, a tribunal’s authority to fill gaps in the
procedural rules can be characterized as arising from its inherent
power to define procedure and its power to fill gaps in the parties’
agreement. The tribunal’s inherent power to fill procedural gaps is well
recognized. Scholar Gary Born notes that a tribunal’s power to fill procedural gaps “is one of the foundational elements of the international
arbitral process.”6 A tribunal’s inherent power to define procedure is
also substantial, subject only to the parties’ agreement, mandatory
rules from the lex arbitri, and the tribunal’s general duties.7 The tribublog.kluwerarbitration.com/2014/04/23/icca-2014-gap-filling-in-international-arbitrationan-unsettled-territory (discussing approaches to gap filling in party contracts).
4. See JEFFREY WAINCYMER, PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION § 2.2 (2012) (describing this understanding of arbitral tribunal power as “hybrid of
consent and jurisdictional paradigms.”).
5. ANDREA MARCO STEINGRUBER, CONSENT IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION § 2.20, at
16 (Loukas Mistelis ed., 2012).
6. GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 15.03, at 2145 (2nd ed.
2014).
7. WAINCYMER, supra note 4, at § 2.9.2, at 115.
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nal’s inherent authority may be authorized by Conventions, national
law, or arbitral norms.8
The tribunal’s power to fill gaps in the procedural rules selected
by the parties can also be characterized as an exercise of the tribunal’s
authority to fill gaps in the parties’ agreement. As noted above, the
principle of party autonomy empowers the parties to contractually define the procedural rules applicable to the resolution of their dispute.9
Thus, when a tribunal applies the procedural rules chosen by the parties, it is applying the terms of the parties’ agreement.10 When a
tribunal’s authority to apply the procedural rules is understood in
these terms, it becomes apparent that a deficiency in the rules selected
by the parties is actually a deficiency in the parties’ agreement. In
other words, a gap in the parties’ agreement that the tribunal has the
undisputed authority to fill.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in the case of Green Tree Financial
Corp. v. Bazzle, highlighted the contractual nature of the tribunal’s
power to construe a parties’ agreement to resolve procedural questions.11 The issue presented by Bazzle was whether an arbitral
tribunal had the power to arbitrate a class action claim where the arbitration agreement was silent on this type of procedure.12 The Court
concluded that whether the arbitration agreement permitted a class
8. See, e.g., European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration of 1961,
European Commission for Europe art. IV(4)(d), Apr. 21, 1961, 484 U.N.T.S. 349; U.N.
COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LAW [UNCITRAL] MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1985: WITH
AMENDMENTS AS ADOPTED IN 2006, art. 19(2), at 14, U.N. Doc A/40/17, annex I, U.N. Sales
No. E.08.V.4 (2008), https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/0786998_Ebook.pdf [hereinafter UNCITRAL]; See BORN, supra note 6, at § 15.03, at 1244-45.
9. The parties’ power to choose the applicable procedural rules is memorialized at
multiple levels of arbitration law. At the international level, Article V(1)(d) of the New York
Convention permits a state to decline enforcement of an award if the arbitral proceedings
did not comply with the parties’ agreement. At the national level, the lex arbitri usually
obligates a tribunal to give effect to the parties’ chosen procedural rules. For example, Article 19(1) of the Uncitral Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration recognizes the
parties’ right to select procedural rules subject only to the mandatory rules of the Model
Law. See BORN, supra note 6, at § 15.02(F), at 2144 (discussing national legislation limiting
right of parties to determine procedural rules).
10. This is true even in cases where the institutional rules explicitly authorize the tribunal to fill gap in the applicable rules. After all, such an authorization only has effect by
virtue of the parties’ agreement. That is, absent contractual authorization to apply this particular rule, the rule itself would be devoid of power. See, e.g., ICC Arbitration Rules, art. 19
(2017) (“The proceedings before the arbitral tribunal shall be governed by the Rules and,
where the Rules are silent, by any rules which the parties or, failing them, the arbitral
tribunal may settle on . . . .”).
11. 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
12. Id. at 452-53.
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proceeding was a question of interpretation to be resolved by the arbitrator in the dispute.13 The Court’s decision in Bazzle ties the
arbitrator’s power to resolve procedural gaps to the arbitrator’s power
to interpret the parties’ agreement.14 This link is significant because it
provides a basis for arbitrators to exercise a similar power where procedural rules selected by the parties are silent on an issue.15
Having reviewed the two powers that tribunals can exercise to
fill gaps in procedural rules, the close connection and even overlap between these powers should be evident. After all, an exercise of the
inherent power of the tribunal to define procedure is limited by the
procedural arrangements the parties made in their agreement. Thus,
the inherent power of the tribunal to define procedure may be characterized as arising out of the tribunal’s general power to fill gaps in the
parties’ agreement. Most States reject this characterization of a tribunal’s authority and instead recognize the authority to fill procedural
gaps as distinct from the power to fill contractual gaps.16
For example, the U.S. Supreme Court in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds International Corp. appears to have adopted a more limited view of a tribunal’s authority to fill procedural gaps.17 StoltNielsen involved a challenge to an arbitral tribunal’s ruling that arose
out of an anti-trust claim against the Appellant, a maritime shipping
company.18 Pursuant to the parties’ agreement, the dispute was submitted to an arbitral tribunal constituted under and subject to the
American Arbitration Association’s Class Arbitration Rules.19 The parties stipulated that their agreement was silent on the issue of class
arbitration however the Rules required the tribunal to first consider
whether the arbitration clause allowed for this type of arbitration.20
The tribunal ultimately concluded that the contract did allow for class
arbitration but stayed the proceedings to allow for judicial review.21
The Appellant challenged the award, alleging that the tribunal’s deci13. Id. at 453.
14. Id. at 451.
15. Id. at 453. The outcome in Bazzle should not be understood as a significant expansion of a tribunal’s authority. Rather, Bazzle is noteworthy in that it demonstrated the
source of the tribunal’s authority to fill procedural gaps as arising from the contract rather
than the rules themselves.
16. Compare UNCITRAL, supra note 8 (describing the procedural determination powers proscribed to arbitral tribunals) with UNICITRAL, supra note 8, at art. 28.
17. 559 U.S. 662 (2010).
18. Id. at 666-67.
19. Id. at 667.
20. Id. at 668.
21. Id. at 669.
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sion was in “manifest disregard of the law.”22 The District Court for the
Southern District of New York agreed and vacated the award.23 This
Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari.24
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and held that
the tribunal’s decision was in manifest disregard of the law because it
failed to consider possible default rules either in applicable state or
maritime law that would have filled the silence in the parties’ agreement.25 In so holding, the Court indicated that a tribunal may not
“proceed[ ] as if it had the authority of a common-law court to develop
what it viewed as the best rule to be applied in such a situation.”26 The
Court clarified that “[i]t is only when [an] arbitrator strays from interpretation and application of the agreement and effectively ‘dispense[s]
his own brand of industrial justice’ that his decision may be unenforceable.”27 This reasoning reveals two things. First, the Court has a
somewhat narrow view of the Tribunal’s authority to fill procedural
gaps.28 Second, the Court believes that the power to fill gaps is constrained to the interpretation of the parties’ contract or application of
relevant state and federal laws.29
The Court did distinguish the tribunal’s decision on the permissibility of class actions as distinct from other procedural rulings,
leaving open the possibility that a tribunal may have an inherent
power to define procedure on less significant procedural questions.30
Nevertheless, tribunals in the U.S. should be wary of making procedural determinations on the basis of their inherent power and instead
should treat all procedural determinations as an effort to construe the
parties’ agreement.
While the precise nature of a tribunal’s authority to fill procedural gaps may appear strictly academic, it effects what the tribunal
must consider in making its procedural determination. If the tribunal
can fill procedural gaps based solely on its inherent power to define
22. Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 559 U.S. at 669-70 (internal quotation marks omitted).
23. Id. at 669.
24. Id. at 670.
25. Id. at 673, 678.
26. Id. at 673-74.
27. Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 559 U.S. at 671 (quoting Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v.
Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001)).
28. Compare the Court’s decision in Stolt-Nielsen with Abaclat, infra note 57.
29. Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 559 U.S. at 676-77.
30. Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 559 U.S. at 685 (“[C]lass-action arbitration changes the nature
of arbitration to such a degree that it cannot be presumed the parties consented to it by
simply agreeing to submit their disputes to an arbitrator.”).

\\jciprod01\productn\F\FAM\13-1\FAM105.txt

130

unknown

Seq: 6

FLORIDA A & M UNIV. LAW REVIEW

7-AUG-19

14:39

Vol. 13:1:125

procedure, then it is not limited by the intent or presumed intent of the
parties. Put differently, the tribunal is not obligated to first construe
the agreement and then, in the absence of direction, fill a contractual
gap with its assessment of what the parties would have done had they
contemplated the matter. Instead, the tribunal is empowered to consider a variety of sources like arbitral norms and commentaries on the
applicable procedural rules that would otherwise be non-instructive as
to party intent. In the wake of Stolt-Nielsen, however, tribunals in the
U.S. should be careful when relying on these sources if such reliance
could create the appearance that the tribunal was not effectuating the
parties’ intent.
I will now turn to a discussion of the consequences of finding a
gap in the procedural rules. The consequences of finding or failing to
find a gap in the parties’ chosen procedural rules are limited from the
perspective of the tribunal. It is axiomatic that tribunals have a significant amount of discretion to interpret the chosen procedural rules.31
Indeed, the rules often further confirm the tribunal’s authority to interpret the procedural rules and, in so doing, determine whether the
rules contain a gap.32 Because of this discretion, a tribunal’s conclusion
that a gap exists in the chosen procedural rules is unlikely to raise
questions of award enforceability. However, the way in which a tribunal fills a procedural gap may raise concerns, particularly after the
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Stolt-Nielsen.
Having identified a gap in the applicable procedural rules, a tribunal must then decide how to fill that gap. As has been repeatedly
emphasized, a tribunal has significant discretion in how it fills procedural gaps. However, tribunals should bear in mind the broader legal
framework in which this decision is made to ensure the enforceability
of its award. Preliminarily, a tribunal must always ensure that the
procedural question is not addressed by a mandatory provision of the
lex arbitri. If a mandatory provision on point exists in the lex arbitri,
then the tribunal must apply this procedure regardless of whether a
gap in the procedural rules exists. Any award issued, even if in full
compliance with the chosen rules, will not be confirmed if it fails to
comply with the national law that authorized the arbitration.
31. Gary Born describes the tribunal’s discretion to fill in procedural gaps as “one of
the foundational elements of the international arbitral process.” BORN, supra note 6, at
§ 15.03, at 2145.
32. See, e.g., Ctr. for Arbitration & Mediation of the Chamber of Commerce BrazilCanada (CAM/CCBC) Arbitration Rules, art. 13 (Sept. 1, 2011) (granting tribunal authority
to interpret rules based on majority vote of the arbitrators); ICC Rules of Arbitration, art. 19
(2017)(granting tribunal authority to select procedural rules after finding the ICC’s rules
are silent).
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If the lex arbitri does not demand a particular outcome, a tribunal should consider any procedural norms established by the
applicable enforcement treaty. For example, the provisions of the New
York Convention are understood to “impose a uniform international
standard of procedural fairness and equality.”33 Because of the paramount importance of issuing enforceable awards, tribunals should fill
procedural gaps in a way that is sensitive to the norms established by
the applicable enforcement convention even if it means providing less
protection for other norms like cost minimization. In weighing competing arbitral norms, tribunals should consider any preferences
expressed by national courts regarding which norms should be given
priority in making procedural determinations. Gary Born notes that in
the commercial context, a preference exists for “considerations of efficiency, party autonomy and equality of treatment, as distinguished
from the parties’ right to be heard.”34 Finally, a tribunal should bear in
mind duties that arise out of broader norms of international
arbitration.35
Two relevant norms that may influence a tribunal’s exercise of
its procedural discretion are the norms of commerciality and timeliness. In view of the norm of commerciality, a tribunal should exercise
its procedural discretion in a way that protects the parties’ procedural
expectations that may have arisen based on international commercial
practice rather than the parties’ agreement.36 Acknowledging and attempting to protect these types of interests is consistent with wellrecognized principles of international commercial law.37 The tribunal’s
duty to ensure timely resolution of the dispute should also be considered when filling procedural gaps. The duty of timeliness will often
conflict with other norms so any exercise of a tribunal’s procedural discretion on this basis should be carefully balanced against competing
considerations such as the parties right to be heard.38
II. BORROWED RULE PRINCIPLE

AS A

TOOL

TO

IDENTIFY GAPS

In view of the tribunal’s substantial discretion to interpret procedural rules, there does not appear to be a uniform understanding of
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
Mar. 2,
38.

BORN, supra note 6, at § 15.04(A)(1)(b), at 2157.
Id. at § 15.04(B)(1), at 2170.
WAINCYMER, supra note 4, at § 2.7.10.
JULIAN LEW, CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, 540 (1978).
See, e.g., United Nations Convention on the International Sales of Goods, art. 9(2),
1987, U.N. DOCS. A/CONF.97/19.
WAINCYMER, supra note 4, at § 2.7.9.2.
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what constitutes a gap that must be filled in the exercise of a tribunal’s
discretion as opposed to silence that precludes a particular procedure.
In the interest of procedural predictability and the uniform development of arbitral practice, institutions should move towards a defined
approach for identifying gaps in institutional rules. To this end, I propose the recognition of a Borrowed Rule Principle to assist tribunals in
the identification of procedural gaps.
Application of the Borrowed Rule Principle is straightforward; a
tribunal engages in a comparative analysis of similar rules from other
institutions to determine how those rules deal with the procedural
question at issue. In the context of procedural gaps, the Borrowed Rule
Principle would serve two functions. The first function is to provide
preliminary evidence that a gap exists by acting as an interpretative
tool. If a tribunal can confirm by reference to other rules that there is a
clear practice to address certain well-known procedural issues, then
the failure to address such an issue in a set of procedural rules is good
evidence of a gap. In other words, the Borrowed Rule Principle will
assist tribunals in the identification of gaps by providing context
against which the rules were drafted and agreed to by the parties.
Using a Borrowed Rule Principle to identify gaps in procedural
rules has several benefits. For example, identifying gaps by reference
to other institutional rules will encourage more thorough rulemaking
by institutions. As institutional rules become more sophisticated and
deal with more expansive procedural questions, less detailed rules will
become relatively less complete. If an institution perceives an unintended gap in its rules based on the development of other institutional
rules, then it will either create a particular rule to deal with that issue
or expressly reserve the matter for resolution by a tribunal’s discretion.
The Borrowed Rule Principle also recognizes and provides some protection for the expectations that parties may have developed based on
their past experiences with arbitration. If a party has arbitrated under
different institutional rules in the past, their expectations will be
largely based on that experience. By encouraging institutions to consider other institutional practices in the development of their rules,
they will be better equipped to understand, manage and preserve those
expectations.
A possible criticism of the Borrowed Rule Principle is that it
would diminish the discretion of the tribunal to interpret procedural
rules and ultimately the flexibility of arbitral procedures. However, the
promotion of procedural predictability outweighs the need to preserve
arbitrator discretion particularly when, as is the case here, the tradeoff between predictability and discretion is minimal. Procedural pre-
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dictability, unlike the promotion of tribunal discretion, is a wellrecognized policy objective in international arbitration and issues of
fairness and justice are inextricably linked to parties’ ability to predict
the conduct of their proceedings.39 Moreover, the Borrowed Rule Principle does not actually limit a tribunal’s discretion. Tribunals would be
free to apply the Borrowed Rule Principle and make findings without
intervention from the institution or national courts. Indeed, developing
a clear approach to identifying gaps in the procedural rules may encourage tribunals to exercise their discretion more freely if they are
confident they have discretion on a particular procedural matter. For
institutions that are truly interested in maximizing flexibility in their
procedural rules, recognizing the Borrowed Rule Principle as a guideline rather than a binding canon may be a viable option. There are two
justifications for using the Borrowed Rule Principle in this way. First,
some States already recognize a similar principle known as the Borrowed Statute Rule in the interpretation of statutes.40 Accordingly, the
Borrowed Rule Principle provides a familiar approach for parties involved in arbitral proceedings. Second, the development of
institutional rules is a careful process that is done after careful consideration of broader arbitral practice. Indeed, Professor Jeffrey
Waincymer, notes that all institutions “engage in widespread comparative analysis in considering reforms” to their rules and “the
UNCITRAL Rules will always be a guide in considering what issues to
cover.”41 Because rules are developed in the context of careful and extensive comparative analysis, they should be understood and
interpreted using a similar analytical approach.
The value of the Borrowed Rule Principle as an interpretative
tool can be demonstrated by using it to identify a purported gap in Article 4 of the CAM-CCBC Rules. Article 4 of the CAM-CCBC Rules
outlines a multi-step process to commence an arbitral proceeding. The
initial step is contained in Article 4.1 which requires the claimant to
notify the institution that it intends to commence proceedings against
another party. This notice must contain certain documents calculated
to apprise both the institution and the respondent of the nature of the
claimant’s claim. Article 4 chronologically concludes with Article 4.18
which relates to the signing of the terms of reference. Missing from this
process is a clear statement of the point in time at which the proceed39. WAINCYMER, supra note 4, at §1.2.9 (“It is highly desirable that procedural determinations are consistent and predictable.”).
40. See HILLEL LEVIN, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: A PRACTICAL LAWYERING COURSE
239 (2nd ed. 2016).
41. WAINCYMER, supra note 4, at § 3.14.
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ings are deemed to have commenced. An argument can be made that
proceedings commence at the moment in time the claimant complies
with Article 4.1 because this is the only section that ties commencement to a particular action. The tribunal must therefore resolve this
question as a matter of interpretation
A tribunal using the Borrowed Rule Principle to identify a gap
in Article 4 of the CAM-CCBC Rules must answer the following question: Do other rules define a particular point in time at which the
arbitration has been commenced? The answer appears to be yes. As
noted previously, the Uncitral Arbitration Rules are the most authoritative in terms of defining norms in arbitration rules.42 Article 3(2) of
those rules states: “Arbitral proceedings shall be deemed to commence
on the date on which the notice of arbitration is received by the respondent.”43 Similarly, Article 4(3) the ICC Rules of Arbitration provides
that “The date on which the Request is received by the Secretariat
shall, for all purposes, be deemed to be the date of the commencement
of the arbitration.”44 A review of other institutional rules confirms this
practice.45 Because there is a clear practice among institutions to define a particular point in time at which commencement occurs, the
Borrowed Rule Principle suggests that there is a gap in the procedural
rules.
The Borrowed Rule Principle should not be the only tool used to
resolve interpretative questions. In some cases arbitral practice clearly
endorses a particular procedural mechanisms that is embodied by the
use of a term of art. For example, Article 8 of the CAM-CCBC Rules
provides “[u]nless the parties have otherwise agreed, the Arbitral Tribunal can grant provisional measures, both injunctive and
anticipatory, that can, at the discretion of the Arbitral Tribunal, be
subject to the provision of guarantees by the requesting party.”46
It is clear based on the language of Article 8 that a tribunal has the
authority to grant provisional measures, but would this provision allow
a tribunal to order security for costs? Reference to other institutional
42.
43.
44.
45.

WAINCYMER, supra note 4.
UNICITRAL art. III(2), supra note 8.
UNICITRAL art. IV(3), supra note 8.
See, e.g., ARBITRATION INST. OF STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION
RULES X, art. 8 (2017) (Swed.) [hereinafter AISCCC ARBITRATION RULES]; CHINA INT’L ECON.
AND TRADE ARBITRATION COMM’N ARBITRATION RULES, art. 11 (promulgated by the China
Council for the Promotion of International Trade/China International Commerce, Nov. 4,
2014, effective Jan. 1, 2015) [hereinafter CIETC ARBITRATION RULES]; LONDON COURT OF
INT’L ARBITRATION RULES, art. 1.4 (2014) (Eng.) [hereinafter LCIA ARBITRATION RULES].
46. Ctr. for Arbitration & Mediation of the Chamber of Commerce Brazil-Canada
(CAM/CCBC) Arbitration Rules, art. 8 (Sept. 1, 2011).
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rules reveals only general grants of authority to tribunals to order provisional measures.47 However, looking beyond other institutional rules,
it is apparent that the power to grant provisional measures is widely
regarded as including the power to order security for costs.48 Tribunals
should, therefore, use the Borrowed Rule Principle carefully and be
mindful of terms of art that grant the tribunal broader authority than
may initially be apparent.
The second function of the Borrowed Rule Principle is to provide
evidence of intent when the nature of silence in procedural rules is in
question. Historically, assessing the significance of silence in procedural rules has been a speculative if not conclusory process.49 However,
analyzing the context in which the silence occurs may assist tribunals
in ascertaining the significance of the silence. Practically speaking,
tribunals are likely to encounter two types of silence in procedural
rules: intentional and unintentional. The value of the Borrowed Rule
Principle here is to provide evidence that will allow the tribunal to
characterize the nature of the silence it has encountered.
Intentional silence in the procedural rules implies that the institution considered but decided not to address a particular procedural
issue.50 In cases of intentional silence, there are two divergent though
reasonable interpretations that may be clarified by applying the Borrowed Rule Principle.51 One reasonable interpretation of intentional
silence is that the institution contemplated the procedural issue but
concluded that, in the interest of flexibility, it would not address the
issue, instead leaving it to the tribunal’s discretion. A second reasonable interpretation of the institution’s intentional silence is that the
institution made the decision to exclude a contemplated procedure as a
matter of policy. Under this interpretation, a tribunal would not have
the discretion to supplement the rules. An example of this interpreta47. UNITED NATIONS COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW ARBITRATION RULES, art. 26 (2010)
[hereinafter UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules]; CIETAC ARBITRATION RULES, art. 23; But see
LCIA ARBITRATION RULES, art. 25, ¶ 25.2.
48. ALI YESILIRMAK, PROVISIONAL MEASURES IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 5-84 (2005).
49. See, e.g., UNICITRAL, supra note 8.
50. Although I discuss intentional silence in the context of the institution’s intent, the
intent of the parties in agreeing to the rules is also relevant. I will assume for purposes of
this discussion, however, that the parties, by agreeing the institutional rules have adopted
the intent of the institution when it created the rules.
51. A GUIDE TO THE NAI ARBITRATION RULES: INCLUDING A COMMENTARY ON DUTCH
ARBITRATION LAW 266 (Bommel Van Der Bend et al. eds., 2009) (“[T]he absence of an explicit
provision on a certain right of the parties could mean that . . .the parties [do] not hav[e] that
right. . . It could, however, also mean . . . the arbitral tribunal may determine whether or
not to grant this right to the parties.”).
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tion of silence can be seen in Perenco v. Ecuador where the tribunal
interpreted intentional silence on the question of its power to reopen
and reverse an award as the denial of its power to do so.52 The tribunal
took direction from other provisions in the rules in an effort to ascertain the amount of discretion available to it to develop appropriate
procedures.53 The tribunal concluded that a provision in the applicable
rules limiting the parties’ right to appeal the award prevented the tribunal’s creation of procedural rules to reopen and review the award.
The second type of silence often encountered by tribunals is unintentional. Unintentional silence occurs when the parties’ dispute
presents a procedural question that was simply not contemplated by
the institution when it developed the procedural rules or the parties
when they agreed to the procedural rules. Unlike intentional silence,
unintentional silence is not evidence of an effort to limit or expand the
authority of the tribunal.
An example of unintentional silence frequently encountered by
tribunals relates to whether the chosen procedural rules allow for class
actions which are usually not expressly authorized by the procedural
rules. This was the issue encountered by the tribunals in Bazzle and
Stolt-Nielsen.54 As noted previously, the tribunal in Stolt-Nielsen concluded that silence on the issue of class actions was meant that this
was a discretionary issue for the tribunal and so allowed the proceedings to continue. This decision was reversed by the U.S. Supreme
Court. Another tribunal, in the case of Abaclat v. Argentine Republic,
addressed whether silence in the applicable procedural rules on the issue of “mass actions” precluded the creation of procedural rules
necessary to arbitrate “mass action” claims.55 The tribunal concluded
that silence on mass actions was not an intentional effort to exclude
this type of proceeding but rather a mere oversight by the creators of
the rules.56 The tribunal reasoned that because mass actions were
“quasi inexistant” at the time the rules were promulgated, the creators
of the rules merely failed to contemplate procedures for handling mass
actions.57 The tribunal then reasoned that, consistent with the spirit of
52. Perenco Ecuador Limited v. The Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6,
Decision on Ecuador’s Reconsideration Motion, ¶ 77 (Apr. 10, 2015).
53. Id.
54. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds Int’t Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010).
55. Abaclat and Others v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/05, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶ 517 (Aug. 4, 2011).
56. Id. at ¶ 519.
57. Id. The decision in Abaclat was not unanimous. Professor Georges Abi- Saab, the
arbitrator appointed by Argentina, argued that silence arising out of non-contemplation by
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the applicable rules and Convention, a mass action proceeding was
permissible.
Stolt-Nielsen and Abaclat paint different pictures of the nature
of a tribunal’s discretion to fill gaps created by unintentional silence.
Obviously, for tribunals constituted under U.S. law, Stolt-Nielsen is
the final word absent further clarification from the U.S. Supreme
Court. For these tribunals, the Court did recognize a more limited form
of tribunal discretion in cases where the procedural question was not
as fundamental as whether class actions were permissible under the
terms of the parties’ agreement. It has been suggested that Stolt-Nielsen can be interpreted to apply only when tribunals “ignore all relevant
sources of law and instead impose their own brand of [industrial] justice.”58 If this interpretation is correct, then Stolt-Nielsen is not
inconsistent with Abaclat because the tribunal’s reasoning there was
based on what it understood to be the spirit of the applicable law.
Whether this is the correct interpretation of Abaclat remains unclear
but tribunals that bear in mind their general duties such as fair treatment of the parties and timely resolution of disputes will likely not run
afoul of Stolt-Nielsen in minor procedural decisions. Tribunals constituted under non-U.S. law, likely have a level of discretion as reflected
in Abaclat to fill unintended silence on procedural questions. This discretion arises out of the inherent power of the tribunal to decide
procedure. As with tribunals seeking to avoid Stolt-Nielsen problems,
tribunals exercising their general power to define procedure should
bear in mind their general duties as they make procedural
determinations.
The main value of the Borrowed Rule Principle in cases of silence in procedural rules is to provide evidence as to whether silence in
a set of procedural rules was intentional or unintentional. Where other
institutional rules address a particular procedural issue, the Borrowed
Rule Principle supports a presumption that an institution was aware
of this procedural issue but chose not to address it in its own rules.
Accordingly, this silence can be characterized as intentional rather
than unintentional. The Borrowed Rule Principle is of limited value in
resolving the follow up question, that is, whether the silence was inthe creators of the rules should not automatically be interpreted to allow the non-contemplated procedure. Abi-Saab’s reasoning was predicated on whether Argentina could have
consented to a mass action proceeding when it signed onto the convention that was the basis
for arbitration if such a mass action proceeding was not contemplated at the time consent
was given. This is consent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning in Stolt-Nielsen. See
Abaclat and Others v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/05, Dissenting
Opinion to Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶ 165 (Aug. 4, 2011).
58. Mamounas, supra note 3.
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tended to preclude a particular procedural mechanism or leave it to the
discretion of the tribunal. The Borrowed Rule Principle may support
the conclusion that, where the practice among institutions is to specifically define a particular procedural issue, the failure to do so in a set of
rules is to deny that authority to the tribunal. However, this is not a
necessary conclusion. In addition to being the product of extensive
comparative analysis, institutional rules are also created against the
backdrop of the tribunal’s broad discretion to define procedure and it is
a recognized norm in rule development to write broad rules with limited specification. In light of these two factors, tribunals should
hesitate to use the Borrowed Rule Principle in cases of intentional silence to limit their authority.
CONCLUSION
Procedural rules in arbitration are broadly written in an effort
to promote flexibility and the exercise of tribunal discretion. However,
as demonstrated by Stolt-Nielsen, the lack of a defined approach to the
identification of gaps in procedural rules makes the exercise of a tribunal’s procedural discretion uncertain. To ameliorate this uncertainty,
the arbitration community should promote the development of tools
that facilitate the identification of procedural gaps that must be filled
in an exercise of tribunal discretion. The Borrowed Rule Principle may
help in this regard as it could assist tribunals as an interpretative tool
to identify gaps in procedural rules and provide evidence where the
intent behind silence in rules is unclear. Adopting the Borrowed Rule
Principle as a part of broader arbitral practice has the potential to improve procedural predictability as well as to avoid situations like that
encountered in Stolt-Nielsen where a tribunal inadvertently exceeds its
procedural-making discretion.

